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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BILL BROWN REALTY, INC.,
PlaintiffAppellant ,
Case No. 14,649
vs .
LEAH N. ABBOTT,
DefendantRespondent .

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Bill Brown Realty, Inc., hereinafter Appellant, sued
Leah N. Abbott, hereinafter Respondent, for a real estate
commission.

The claim was based solely on rights allegedly

acquired under a real estate listing contract giving the
Appellant an exclusive right to sell during a three-month
period.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was heard by the Honorable J. Robert Bullock
of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County.

At the

pre-trial conference, the Court concluded that there were no
disputed issues of fact and instructed counsel for both parties
to submit Motions for Summary Judgment.

Based upon the memoranda

filed in support of those motions, the Court concluded that the
listing contract had expired by its own terms prior to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sale of the property by the owner herself.

The Court there-

fore granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial
court was correct and should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Leah N. Abbott was the owner of a home located
at 2730 Arapahoe, Provo, Utah.

On April 25, 1975, she listed

the home for sale with Bill Brown Realty, Inc. under the inducements of one Mrs. Malone, a salesperson for Appellant.
The listing contract which was furnished by the broker
consists of a standard-form one-page card.

The top half is

filled in with information about the property, and the bottom
half recites the "Sales Agency Contract".
Both the top and bottom portions of the document
recited the listing date as April 25, 1975.

The top half

gives the expiration date as July 25, 1975.

An expiration

time is also given in the bottom half, which reads in pertinent
part as follows:
In consideration of your agreement to list
the property described in this contract, and
to use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser
therefor, I/we hereby grant you for the period
of
3
(number in handwriting) months from
date thereof the exclusive right to sell,
exchange or lease said property or any part
thereof, at the price and terms stated hereon,
or at such other price or terms to which I/we
may agree.
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At the time she signed the listing agreement, Respondent was told that she could get out of the listing agreement
before the expiration date without any trouble if she so
desired.

Shortly thereafter, Respondent did desire to termi-

nate the agency contract.

She was dissatisfied with what she

felt to be wholly inadequate efforts to sell her house, and
she wanted to sell the house herself or at least list it with
someone else who might give her better service.
On June 20, 1975, Respondent went to the broker's
office and signed another standard-form agreement, which she
was told was a release.

She thought that ten days later she

w ould be again free to do with her property as she wished.
She was not given a copy of the document when she signed it
Only later did she realize that she had further obligated
herself to pay Appellant a commission.

That document is

exhibit "B" of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
reads as follows:

*i o

/"^

* /

.tl^$^~v,~06,.&tl Sl^.
M e m b e r of U t a h County Board of

Gentlemen:

In

consideration

of

your, a g r e e m e n t

to

remove

^^2J^l4o^^±^^

the

listing

of

Realtor/^''

my

property

located

from fne f;(e$ of fhe MulMpU L;$f;ng

S

r * V L - e ' .*L"J f h ° . o f f l c e s < b e , o n 9 ' n g f o toe M u l t i p l e Listing Service, effective 10 days from
6»\*
of th»s withdrawal notice, and the further agreement on your part to withhold your efforts to
secure a buyer for said p r o p e r t y ; I agree that if said property is sold I will pay your commission
at required under terms of the Listing C o n t r a c t .
R.E.B. N o .
XLL/

Dated .1 (fJ^*-

*^-

_/^/-_

£

op o.

_. r

^_

Accepted:

A p p r o v e d by

DATE

C -'Z3'?S'
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Upon learning that she might still be obligated to
pay a commission until the end of the original listing agreement, Respondent was reluctant to enter into a contract of
sale during that period.

However, she continued to show

the property to prospective buyers.

Among her other efforts

to sell the property, she held an "Open House11 on the property on July 23, 1975.

On that date she first met one Harry

R. Nord, who was one of the prospects who viewed the house.
He returned two days later and on July 25, after some negotiations, signed an Earnest Money Agreement and a check for
$5,000.00.

The Agreement recites a sales price of $57,000.00.

During the following week, Respondent obtained approval of the transaction from her two daughters, who also
owned an interest in the property.

On August 1, 1975, the

sale was closed and the deed from Respondent and her daughters
to Mr. Nord and his wife was delivered and recorded.

That

deed had been prepared in advance in blank for the convenience
of the sellers.

.,.,,,.

On several occasions, through letters and conversations, Respondent indicated to Appellant and/or his agent
that she understood that on July 25, 1975, the listing would
be expired and she would be able to sell the property herself without having to pay a commission.

On none of these

occasions did Appellant or his agent attempt to correct her
or take a contrary position.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
ARE PRESUMED CORRECT.

The Appellant has the burden of proving by a clear
preponderance of the evidence that the trial court's findings
and judgment are erroneous.

The Supreme Court will review

the evidence and all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom
in the light favorable to the trial court's findings and
judgment. Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., 29 Utah2d
421, 511P.2d 145 (1973).

As the Court stated in Del Porto

v. Nicolo, 27 Utah2d 286, 495 P.2d 811

(1972):

. . .it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged position of the
trial court, in close proximity to the parties
and witnesses, there is indulged a presumption
of correctness of his findings and judgment,
with the burden upon the appellant to show
they were in error; and where the evidence is
in conflict we do not upset his findings merely
because we may have reviewed the matter differently, but do so only if the evidence clearly
preponderates against them.
This standard is made even clearer by Crockett v.
Nish, 106 Utah 241, 147 P.2d 853 (1944).

There the court

stated:
. . .if (after reviewing the case) we are in
doubt or even if there be a slight preponderance in our minds against the trial court's
conclusions we will affirm.
Other jurisdictions have a standard at least this
stringent.

For example, where a trial court resolved con-

flicting evidence in favor of the defendant in an action to
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cancel a deed, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered
bound thereby.

itself

Westover v. Harris, 137 P.2d 771, 774 (N.M.

1943).
Since in this case both parties submitted Motions
for Summary Judgment, the trial court does not view the evidence in light favorable to one party or the other.

But

even if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to Appellant, the result is the same.

The only factual issue

was the date of the sale of the property, and that is not in
dispute.

Neither party contends that the sale took place

before July 25, 1975.

The only statements regarding that point

are in the affidavits which state, as reiterated in the Appellant's brief, that the property was shown and inspected on
the 23rd day of July.

Appellant does not contend that that

amounts to a sale entitling him to a commission.

Therefore,

there is no factual issue in dispute and the case was properly disposed of by summary judgment.

II.

APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION
BECAUSE THE LISTING AGREEMENT HAD EXPIRED
BEFORE THE SALE TOOK PLACE.

On the morning of April 25, 1975, Respondent entered
into an exclusive real estate listing agreement with the Appellant.
of

That agreement was to be in force ". . .for the period
3

months from date thereof. . .[number written in ink]. 11

At issue here is whether that agreement was still in force on

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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July 25, 1975.

This issue is resolved in favor of Respondent

by a proper counting of the days included in the contract.
This Court gave a lucid and unequivocal

explanation

of the proper way to count the days in a matter such as this
in Brennan v. Lynch, 123 Utah 57, 254 P.2d 454 (1953):
. . .a month commences at the beginning of the
day of the month on which it starts and ends at
the expiration of the day before the same day
of the next month. . .. If the month in question
commenced on a day other than on the first day
of such month, such as at the beginning of the
23rd day of such month, it would end at the
expiration of the 22nd day of the next month
and not at the expiration of the 23rd day of
the next month, which would be the beginning
of another month.
A calendar month is defined in 74 Am.Jur.2d Time, §9,
at 593, as the period of time running from the beginning of
a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month.
Appellant cites authorities to the effect that the
first day of a specified period should be excluded and the
last day included.

All those authorities are inapposite to

the present case because they would exclude the first day
of the listing period.

It is clear that if Appellant had

produced a buyer who on April 25 had been ready, willing and
able to buy the listed property at the price recited in the
listing agreement, he would have been entitled to a commission,
It is so improbable as to be ludicrous that he would not claim
a commission, and, if everything else were in order, would

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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receive it.

Therefore, the first day that the contract was

in force, and hence the first day included in the calculation
of the time, was April 25.

The last day of the third month

from that day was July 24.

July 25 was the first day of the

fourth month.

Ergo, there was no listing agreement in force

on July 25.
Appellant contends that Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure excludes the first day of the contract and,
due to the fact that July 24 is a legal holiday, adds an additional day to the contract, extending it to July 25.
Rule 6 is not applicable here.

Rule 6 is expressly

However,
limited

to
. . .any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these rules, by the local rules of any
district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute. . .(U.R.C.P., Rule 6 (a)).
Appellant argues that Rule 6 does apply because in
Utah a real estate broker has a statutory right to sue for
a commission.

That is beside the point.

Rule 6 applies to

periods of time prescribed by statutes, et al.

This case

does not involve any statute of limitations or other period
of time prescribed by statute.

And the period of this listing

agreement was not prescribed or allowed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, by the local rules of any district court, by
order of court, or by any statute.

Rule 6 is a procedural

rule for the purposes of the courts of law and does not govern
contracts between private parties.

-8-
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Appellant reads an error into Judge Bullock's decision
below in that the original Ruling, entered April 15, 1976, stat
that the ". . . Agreement had expired on July 25, 1975 . . ..",
whereas the Minute Entry dated May 28, 1976, says that ". . . t
Court is still of the opinion that the exclusive listing agreement expired by its terms at Midnight July 24, 1975, prior to
the sale of the property

. . . ."

There is really no discrepancy here.

At one time the

Court said that on July 25 there was no agreement because it ha
expired.

He later clarified it for Appellant by specifying the

time at which it expired--midnight July 24.

The Court meant th

same thing both times, and that is made clear in the transcript
on file.
A word is in order here concerning Respondent's reliance on the three-month limitation in the contract.
based on the following reasoning:

It is

There is an ambiguity in

the contract as to the expiration time.

(One manifestation of

that ambiguity is the fact that Appellant and Respondent under
stood and treated it differently.)

Since both mentions of the

time limit were expressly written in, neither is given preference in the construction of the contract.

Therefore, the rule

to be followed is that an ambiguity in the contract must be
construed against the broker.

Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443,

235 P.2d 510 (1950); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts, §§275 and 276,
at 688.

This is especially true where the broker furnishes

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the form and he (or his agent) fills in the blanks.
E. M. Boerke, Inc., v. Williams, 28 Wis.2d 627, 137
N.W.2d 489 (1965), involved an ambiguity relating to the time
of a real estate listing contract.

In that case, the agree-

ment was to continue in force "until January 15, 1957 ,f .

The

court found that the word "until" was an ambiguous term.

It

left unclear whether or not January 15 was to be included.
The broker fulfilled

the terms of the contract on January 15.

The court construed the ambiguity against the broker, held
that the contract ended on January 14, and denied recovery.
The contract in the present case was to remain in
force ". . .for a period of

3__

months from [April 2 5 ] . . .".

"The word 'from1 when used with respect to measurement of time
has no fixed or specific meaning; standing alone it is ambiguous and equivocal."

74 Am.Jur.2d Time, §21, at 605.

It is

to be construed as a term of inclusion or exclusion according
to

>

inter alia, the equities of the particular case.

Id.

The equities of the present case are discussed below.

III.

BEFORE THE SALE TOOK PLACE, RESPONDENT
WAS RELEASED FROM HER OBLIGATION TO PAY
A COMMISSION.

Appellant contends that he is entitled to a commission
because the sale took place within six months of the expiration
of the listing, to someone who saw the property during the term
of the listing.

That is unsound.

First of all, the owner

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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procured the buyer herself long after the borker had openly
and intentionally ceased all efforts to secure a buyer, and
had so indicated in a signed writing.

Therefore, the findin

of the buyer could not be attributed to the broker's efforts
Furthermore, the release agreement, Exhibit

?I

B"

inserted above, limits Respondent's liability for a commission.

Although it is difficult to discern the meaning of

that document from its face, we must assume it was intended
to have some operative effect between the parties, or they
would not have executed it.

Appellant contents that it furt

obligates Respondent to pay a commission under the listing
contract.

But the consideration recited is the removal of

the property from the Multiple Listing Service and the withholding of the broker's efforts to secure a buyer.

That

cannot be viewed as adequate consideration for a further
obligation to pay a sales commission.

Therefore, the

document must have some other meaning.
A reasonable cons truetion of that agreement would be
that if the property is sold during the ten days before the
withdrawal becomes effective, the owner will pay the commission as required under the contract.

In other words, if the

broker happens to produce a buyer before the property is
removed from the Multiple Listing Service and before the
newspaper ads run out, he still gets a commission.
is the end of the obligation.
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But that

This Court may choose to give the document some other
reasonable interpretation, such as that it terminates the sixmonth post-expiration clause in the listing agreement, or that
it changes the agreement to an "exclusive agency" as opposed
to an "exclusive right to sell".

But it challenges

credulity

to believe that it could serve to reinforce the owner's obligation to pay a commission in return for the broker withholding all his services.

IV.

A.

THE CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY
CLEARLY FAVOR A VERDICT FOR RESPONDENT
AND AGAINST APPELLANT.
Appellant should be estopped from claiming that

a contract was in force on July 25, 1975.
Respondent was led by Appellant and/or his agent(s)
to believe that they considered, as did Respondent, that the
listing agreement would not be in force after the end of the
day on July 24, 1975.
Respondent prepared a letter advertising her property
and stating the terms of sale, and distributed copies to numerous people in the area.

In that letter, a copy of which was

sent to Mrs. Malone, Respondent clearly stated her understanding
that after July 24 the realtor would not be entitled to a commission.

Both the broker and the agent remained silent on

the point, and Respondent justifiably relied on the acquiescence
implied by that silence.
-12-
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In addition, in a telephone conversation that took
place on July 24 between Respondent and the listing agent,
Respondent again stated that it was her understanding that
the listing terminated on that date and that she would be
free to dispose of her property, without having to pay a
commission, on the following day, July 25.

The agent did

not contradict her or give notice in any way that the real
estate company took a different view.
Appellant is now estopped from asserting that the
contract was to be In force on July 25, or that he is entitled
to a commission on the sale that took place on that date.
Respondent justifiably relied on the implied
of the Appellant and/or his agent.

representations

To allow Appellant to

recover under this set of circumstances would be a serious
miscarriageofjustice.
B.

Appellant is not entitled to a commission because

he did not use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser.
Appellant did not fulfill his part of the contract.
The agreement requires that the broker must use reasonable
efforts to find a purchaser.

This he did not do.

In the first place, the broker did not furnish the
ultimate buyer.

He did not present an offer nor does he allege

that he did.
Secondly, Appellant's performance under the contract
was feeble and inadequate.

It fell far below Respondent's
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reasonable expectations.

According to Respondent's Affidavit,

the home was advertised in a local newspaper only twice in two
months.

There was no open house held by the broker.

Neither

the broker nor his agents showed the home to a prospect.

Nothing

was done by the broker beyond placing the two advertisements,
placing the card on the Multiple Listing Service, and placing
a "For Sale" sign on the property.

Surely this cannot be held

to constitute reasonable efforts, as required by the listing
agreement.

Therefore, since the Appellant has not fulfilled

his obligation under the contract, he cannot be allowed to
recover.
C.

A real estate broker should be held to a standard

of "best efforts" when he secures an exclusive listing contract.
Respondent recognizes that an exclusive listing

(that

is, a listing giving the broker an "exclusive right to sell")
entitles the broker to a commission if the property is sold
within the period of the listing, whether through the efforts
of that broker or completely independant of his efforts.

The

rule is restated in Lewis v. Dahl, 180 Utah 486, 161 P.2d

362

(1945), and Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah2d 202, 381 P.2d

84

(1963).

See also 160 A.L.R. 1040 and cases cited therein.
The general rule stated in these cases was formulated
to prevent an unscrupulous property owner from reaping a harvest
from the broker ? s efforts.

It protects the legitimate, consci-

entious broker and makes it more difficult for a devious owner
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to cheat him out of his rightful earnings.

This is cited as

the justification for the rule, Patterson v. Blair, 123 Utah
216, 257 P.2d 944 (1953), and in that context it rests on
sound principle.
However, Respondent contends that the rule is unsound when it is used against a property owner.

Specifically,

the rule should not apply unless the broker has used his best
efforts to find a purchaser.

If carried beyond those limits,

the rule allows an unethical or inefficient broker to sit idle
once he has secured a listing and let the exasperated

owner

or another broker earn his commission for him, with little or
no effort on the part of the listing broker.

This unfairness

is exacerbated by the fact that the use of the exclusive listing
is standard business practice among realtors, and the uninformed or overly trusting public is not in a good position to
bargain for a different arrangement.
The inequities are clearly evident when the rule is
viewed in light of the facts of this case.

Respondent reason-

ably expected prompt, adequate and effective action from the
broker, in return for her relinquishment of the right to deal
freely with her own property without the liability for a
commission.

When Respondent finally took over from the broker

and conducted a vigorous promotional campaign, she found many
interested and qualified prospects.
she had expected the broker to do.

This is precisely what
The Appellant holds himself

out to the public as an expert in his field, and charges a
commission for his services.

Had he exerted the same effort
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as Respondent did, there is good reason to believe he would
have been at least as effective as the owner herself was in
procuring a purchaser.
The broker or his agent asked for two reductions
in the listing price.

The property was originally

listed

at a price of $61,500.00, as is shown in the listing contract,
Exhibit "A" of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellant first asked for a reduction on the sales price to
$59,500.00 to which Respondent agreed.
was made on June 20.

The second request

Respondent was asked to reduce the price

to $55,000.00, which is $6,500.00 below the original listing
price.

Apparently, Appellant grossly miscalculated

market value of defendant's property.

the fair

This reduction is not

even within reason, especially in light of plaintiff's meager
efforts to sell the property.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion, the
rule allowing a broker to collect a commission under an exclusive listing agreement for a sale within the listing period,
regardless of who was the procuring cause of the sale, should
be modified.

The rule should allow an owner to defeat a

broker's claim under an exclusive listing contract if it can
be shown that the broker has had a reasonable time in which
to fulfill his obligation under the contract, and that he
has not exerted his "best efforts" in finding a purchaser.
The broker should be held to this higher standard when he

-

1

6

-
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is granted an exclusive right to sell.

The fiduciary obli-

gation of a broker to his principal already requires this
high standard of loyalty and effort, but it should be made
more explicit. It should be written into the contract.

A

property owner gives up a valuable and important right when
he signs an exclusive listing contract, and should be entitled
to a broker's best efforts in return.

Such a standard is

more just and fair, and will serve to strengthen the confidence
of the public in the real estate broker.

CONCLUSION
The whole question here is whether Appellant earned a
commission from Mrs. Abbott.
did not.

The lower court found that he

On July 25, 1976, the undisputed date of the sale,

Appellant had nothing but an expired contract.

He had agreed

to withhold his efforts to sell the property as of the end of
the previous month, hence he was not entitled to a commission
on a sale to someone who saw the property thereafter.

He did

not have a contract to rely on when the property was sold.
did not earn a commission.

He

It would be patently unfair to

allow him to recover one.
The trial court's judgment is presumed correct.

It

is not clearly erroneous; it is clearly correct and should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

this

/

day of October, 1976
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